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On Agents and Equilibria
Ted Theodosopoulos∗
Ever since my economics class debated the creeping hegemony of market mentality in
human affairs last spring I have wanted to articulate the surprise and wonder I felt at
my students’ probing of homo economicus and his boundaries1. Later in the summer, my
encounters at a conference on new approaches to economics2 strengthened my conviction
of the utility of such an essay. I have finally gathered my thoughts sufficiently to put them
down.
What is homo economicus, but a conception of the economy as a sphere of individual
agents, acting in a rational pursuit of maxima of their endowed utilities, and interacting by
constraining each other’s, and their own, available options, due to fundamental resource
limitations. It is a mindset that seeks to identify alternative actions in every instance, and
enunciate a tradeoff that encompasses the decision-making process of the agent at hand.
It would be useful to put forth a different narrative of the economic sphere, if only as
a check to the range of applicability for the dominant paradigm. It is, after all, at the
interface between competing conceptualizations that elements of reality seep through. In
this spirit, can we lift the conceptual burden of decades, convincing us that conflicting
alternatives are the sole rational view of reality, and construct a plausible paradigm that
evades this pervasive market mentality?
My students came up with the notion of homo socialis, a collection of agents that seek
to maximize their social interactions, their connectedness, as it were, without regard to the
potential economic costs and benefits entailed in this pursuit3. Perhaps, after all, utility
isn’t one-dimensional and its components aren’t exchangeable. Moreover, maybe utility
isn’t assignable to individuals, but is instead an attribute of agent configurations encoding
their state as well as their interactions.
Envisioning such apparently incongruous possibilities is the hallmark of a revolution
that is quietly engulfing economic theorizing. And it isn’t primarily the recent cascade of
global crises that fuels it, but rather the shifting aesthetic of what constitutes convincing
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narratives in our increasingly interdependent information web. The stalwart, mechanistic
paradigm, which sought to confer impartial objectivity and monopolistic conceptual author-
ity to disembodied aggregate forces harks back to the Enlightenment image of the clockwork
physical universe, that defies the need for spontaneous creativity, hopes and imaginings. It
was a world of consistent order, a cosmic billiards in which collisions conferred indubitable
truth, and bounces were eternally predictable, if only we possessed sufficient intellectual
capacity. As if the physical, not to mention the economic, realm were there all along, apart
from us, and all we needed to do is accept its incontrovertible workings. . .
Our models of the physical universe have moved stupendously since then, but a vast edi-
fice was built for understanding the economy based on this long-surpassed model. Physicists
learned that objects and actions coexist in an inseparable reciprocal nexus of transforma-
tions, where reality attains coherence through mutually reinforcing potential configurations
living beyond space, time and incongruity. Mathematicians broadened their perspectives
immensely to accept the inherent, perpetual incompleteness of the quest for incontrovert-
ible knowledge, and learned to thrive in this newly open logical paradigm. It is time that
our notion of the economic sphere evolved beyond the centuries-old set of incompatible
competing alternatives that still suffuse it.
There are two concrete re-conceptualizations I’d like to elaborate on here, in hopes of
clarifying the path I am striving to describe, and to illustrate convincingly the conceptual
burden I alluded to earlier. The first one seeks to debunk the seemingly self-evident ne-
cessity of populating reality with mutually incompatible alternatives, thereby representing
the space of choices as a geometric space of points4. Instead, I propose that we envision
choices as configurations of a network, irreducible to actions at specific nodes. For several
years now, Brandenburger and others have emphasized the irreducible relevance of con-
textuality in our decision-making, more akin to evolving probability distributions over our
joint actions, in a manner resembling the entangled evolution of quantum states5.
After all, the value I assign to various potential actions available to me, and even my
conception of this set of available actions, depends inextricably on my appreciation of
actions by my neighboring agents, and my expectations of their appraisal of my actions,
not to mention the very set of agents I currently consider my neighbors. At any point in
time the joint specification of these variables for all the agents is almost certainly strewn
with inconsistencies, rendering the vision of a representative agent worse than chimeric, as
Kirman has argued for two decades now6.
We navigate these puzzling, incompatible, probabilistic assessments with a scant thought
about the theoretical conundrums they cultivate. Our choices aren’t driven by a desire to
find incontrovertible truth. Instead, we construct narratives to convince ourselves and our
4Technically, our objection is to the standard topology that is taken for granted on this ‘choice space’.
After all, it is always possible to represent any set as a set of points, albeit with a decidedly nontrivial
topology, to appropriately reflect the nature of nearness that is natural for the original set.
5See for example http://iopscience.iop.org/1367-2630/13/11/113036/.
6http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/WhomOrWhatDoesRepIndRepresent.AKirman1992.pdf.
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neighbors of the logic of our actions, unbothered by the occasional necessity of shifting
perspective. In fact, our success in navigating the intricately intertwined paths that criss-
cross the economic sphere rests largely on this uniquely creative ability to re-invent our
reasoning, introducing new, unforeseen twists and wrinkles to what appeared a smooth
explanation earlier.
Such re-imaginings of our surroundings, both actual and potential, cannot be accessed
through an evolution on finite-dimensional spaces of alternatives. We need instead to con-
sider infinite-dimensional path spaces, encompassing historical narratives that go beyond
any finite listing of their turns. We need to accommodate evolving probability distributions
over the space of counterfactual configurations of our information nexus, because many
possible paths contribute simultaneously to the creative reasoning behind our actions.
This first recasting of our economic vision updates the agents that populate the econ-
omy, from distinct individuals, to hierarchically organized objects, with components of
differing dimensionalities, fitting together in geometrically intricate, irreducible evolving
patterns. The second re-imagining I propose involves the questions we ask of these hier-
archical, meta-individual agents. What patterns characterize their observable behaviours?
Do they give rise to the typical structures and institutions that we have come to expect?
In this instance we have to confront another deeply held, if unquestioned, conviction,
which turns out to be less justified, often misleading us to comforting misapprehensions.
The notion I am after involves the interplay we take for granted between time and ran-
domness. What do we mean when we say that an event, like an even number in a die toss,
occurs with some probability, say 1
2
? Strictly speaking, we mean that if we could lay out
and count all the possible outcomes of an experiment, half of them will have the desired
property. But often it’s impractical to literally survey all possible outcomes, even when
they aren’t infinite. After all, the overwhelming majority of numbers are forever beyond
our direct access, even though they are, by definition, finite. What do we do in lieu of this
na¨ıve counting?
In order to probe this question deeper, imagine confronting the question of fairness for
the die. How would you distinguish a biased die from a fair one? You’d roll it many times
and compare the actual, what we call ‘empirical’, outcomes to those expected under the
hypothesis that the die was indeed fair. If, for instance, we roll the die N = 100 times
and we obtain an even number 58 times, we’d probably judge this event to be consistent
with the hypothesis that the die was fair, which would have predicted 1
2
of the outcomes,
i.e. 50, to be even. In fact, statistics tells us that, under the ‘null’ hypothesis of a fair
die, the number of even outcomes out of N = 100 tosses is itself random, with ‘expected
value’ equal to N
2
, i.e. 50, and ‘standard deviation’ equal to
√
N
(
1
2
) (
1− 1
2
)
, i.e. 5. This
latter concept is a measure of the expected spread of the randomness in the number of even
outcomes out of N = 100 tosses, assuming the coin was fair. The actual measurement of
58 even outcomes is only 1.6 standard deviations above the expected value, a level which,
statistics tells us, will not be exceeded with probability 0.9452!
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Let’s marvel for a moment at the fact that, in order to make concrete sense out of
a probabilistic statement, we wound around to another, more sophisticated probabilistic
statement. While this isn’t actually circular thinking, and we have in fact moved to a
higher rung in this conceptual helix, it is well worth pondering this logical ‘closure’, or
self-referential nature of probability. But this isn’t our present quest. And neither is the
remarkable fact that, our reasoning led us actually to doubt the fairness of our coin with
more than 5% confidence! In other words, after this observation, it would be rational, even
profitable, to bet 1 : 20 odds that the coin was biased!
No, our quarry lies deeper. In order to catch a glimpse, imagine that our N = 100
tosses played out in one of the following three ways:
1. First we experienced 58 even rolls and then 42 odd ones.
2. First we experienced 42 even rolls, followed by 42 odd ones, and finally another 16
even ones.
3. We experienced a succession of 42 even-odd roll pairs, followed by 16 even rolls.
The point of course is that, while all these outcomes look indistinguishable in the end, each
would have led us to very different conclusions along the way. For example, under the third
scenario we would never have any reason to doubt the fairness of the die until after the
first 84 tosses, at which point we begin experiencing the pronounced ‘run’ of 16 even rolls.
Already after 10 consecutive even rolls we should have grave doubts as to the fairness of
the die because such a run will occur with probability less than 0.1% if the die were fair.
But what of all the ‘balanced’ tosses that preceded this one-sided run? Should they not
serve to sway our judgement? After all, we’ve observed more than 8 independent sequences
of 10 tosses in a row, all of which were entirely consistent with the fair die hypothesis. How
are we to balance the accumulated evidence in favour of the ‘null’ hypothesis with the more
recent evidence against it?
What if the ‘fairness’ of the die was not determinable, because it varied! Imagine, for
example, that after each roll, we added a dot to the hidden face of the die. Remembering
that a standard 6-sided die has odd and even numbers opposite one another, we see that
after every roll, we would be ‘conditioning’ the next roll to have the same parity as the
previous one!
While the analysis of this nonstandard die is nontrivial, it should be clear that the a
priori symmetric rules and starting configuration must guarantee a symmetric probability
distribution for the outcome over any number of rolls. But, at the same time, it’s equally
clear that we are much more likely to experience unbalanced paths, with overwhelming
majority of one parity or the other over time. To illustrate this dichotomy more concretely,
consider what happens over three consecutive rolls of a standard die versus this peculiar
one we’ve just constructed, as shown in the table below:
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Event
Standard die
probability
Nonstandard die
probability
EEE 1/8 7/27
EEO 1/8 2/27
EOE 1/8 1/12
EOO 1/8 1/12
OEE 1/8 1/12
OEO 1/8 1/12
OOE 1/8 2/27
OOO 1/8 7/27
We see that, while the overall probabilities remain symmetric and balanced, the unbal-
anced paths become increasingly more likely. For example, if we saw a run of three same
parity rolls in a row, under the standard die scenario we could reject the hypothesis that
the die was fair expecting to be wrong with probability 1
4
, while the same inference under
the nonstandard die scenario would lead to a mistake more than half of the time.
The phenomenon at play here is what we call ‘ergodicity’, or lack thereof, and this
die model we are considering allows us to explore it in greater depth. The standard die
scenario is ergodic, because no mater what state of imbalance between odd and even tosses
you happen to find yourself in, there is a sequence of plausible, if highly unlikely, rolls
that will get you to any other state of imbalance you desire. For example, following a
run of 3 even tosses in a row, you may experience with probability 1
128
a run of 7 odd
tosses, bringing the imbalance, measured as the proportion of even tosses, down to 0.3,
even though the die was really fair.
On the other hand, the nonstandard die scenario is non-ergodic, because there are
imbalance states from which you cannot reach all other imbalance states. Imagine for
example 2 even tosses in a row in such a way that two opposite pairs of faces of the die
are both even, while the third pair of faces remains odd on one side and even on the other.
From this state of imbalance, three outcomes are still possible:
1. With probability 2
3
one of the four, pairwise matched even faces comes up, and
nothing changes.
2. With probability 1
6
the sole remaining odd face comes up, changing the opposite side
from even to odd, and therefore increasing the chance that the next toss will be odd
to 1
3
. Note that this die state will no longer change, and so we are, from now on, in
a situation equivalent to that of a standard, but unfair die, with even probability 2
3
and odd probability 1
3
. Thus, the standard statistical argument we saw earlier tells
us that, after N = 100 more tosses, the expected number of even outcomes will be
2N
3
= 66.6¯ with standard deviation equal to
√
N
(
2
3
) (
1− 2
3
)
= 4.6¯.
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In other words, under this scenario, we would expect to see roughly twice as many
even as odd tosses in the long run, even though the process is completely symmetric,
and therefore fair, to begin with. After all, with equal probability, we could have
arrived at a situation where we would expect twice as many odd as even tosses in
the long run. In any case, either of these two situations would lead us to expect a
2 : 1 imbalance over time, as we experience more and more tosses, but the a priori
probability of odd vs. even tosses is clearly 1 : 1, as the system is unbiased, so the
probability of an even toss at any time, after many repetitions of the same experiment
from scratch, is 1
2
.
3. With probability 1
6
the remaining unmatched even face comes up, switching the last
odd face to even, and making it impossible to get an odd number in any subsequent
tosses. Thus, the system is henceforth locked in an all-even monopoly. Of course, with
equal likelihood we could have arrived at a similar all-odd monopoly, in a different
run of the same experiment. Once again we see that, while the prior probability of
obtaining an even number at any point is 1
2
, the empirical proportion of even tosses
over time along any particular path of this experiment will be unbalanced.
It isn’t hard to imagine economic situations that behave this way. In fact, we often act
under the tacit assumption that our actions, and those of the other economic actors, will
change the chances of experiencing different outcomes. More to the point, we experience
the economy as a historically contingent process, inextricably dependent on the path we
happened to follow along the way to our current state, much like the diversity that popu-
lates the living world we inhabit. This marked divergence between the a priori expectation
over counterfactual alternatives and the a posteriori assessment of contingent outcomes is
absent from the dominant economic paradigm, whose epistemology rests instead on the
presumed inexorable discovery of a pre-existing, if unknown, equilibrium, through an im-
partial, mechanical balance of impersonal forces. A far cry from our decidedly strategic,
unbalanced, intricately temporal economic experience!
The emerging agent-based methodology that is making inroads among the economic
literature in the past decade aims to explicitly incorporate these, and other qualitative
deviations from the efficiently mechanistic view of Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. It offers many
tantalizingly open research directions, incorporating the hard-won conceptual battles of
physicists and mathematicians over the last century, not to mention hopes for overcom-
ing the all-too-apparent policy limitations of the dominant paradigm in the face of ever-
intensifying global crises. It is my hope that this new thinking will help economic science
emerge into an era of renewed conceptual prosperity and practical relevance for humanity’s
demanding coordination problems.
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